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 “Loss” Revisited: 
A Defense of the Centerpiece of the 
Federal Economic Crime Sentencing 
Guideline 
Frank O. Bowman, III* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Roughly twenty years ago, I was an Assistant U.S. Attorney detailed as 
Special Counsel to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.  Andy Purdy, then-Dep-
uty General Counsel to the Commission, pulled me aside and asked me to study 
the deficiencies of the then-separate guidelines governing theft and fraud1 and 
to work with Commission staff to propose some remedies.  That request began 
my involvement in the six-year-long process that produced, in 2001, the con-
solidated economic crime guideline, U.S.S.G. §2B1.1. 
I was, for better or worse, one of the principal architects of Section 2B1.1 
in its consolidated 2001 form.2  Over time, I have become a pointed critic both 
 
* Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri School 
of Law. 
 1. Prior to 2001, crimes designated as thefts were covered by U.S.S.G. §2B1.1 
and those designated as frauds were governed by U.S.S.G. §2F1.1. 
 2. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Back to Basics: Helping the Commission 
Solve the “Loss” Mess With Old Familiar Tools, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 115 (1997); Frank 
O. Bowman, III, Coping With “Loss”: A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Eco-
nomic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1998) (setting out and 
explaining the provisions of a proposed consolidated economic crime guideline) [here-
inafter Bowman, Coping With “Loss”]; Frank O. Bowman, III, A Judicious Solution: 
The Criminal Law Committee Draft Redefinition of the “Loss” Concept in Economic 
Crime Sentencing, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 451 (2000) [hereinafter Bowman, Judicious 
Solution]; Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Re-
forms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5 (2001) [hereinafter Bow-
man, 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms]. 
1
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of errors we made in 2001,3 and of some of the ways the Sentencing Commis-
sion has since amended Section 2B1.1.4  Nonetheless, I still support the basic 
structure of Section 2B1.1 and its central component – scaling offense serious-
ness in large measure based on the economic loss caused or intended by the 
defendant.  In particular, I remain convinced that the definition of “loss” 
adopted in 2001 remains fundamentally sound.  Recently, the Missouri Law 
Review published a thoughtful article from Daniel Guarnera sharply criticizing 
the component of the loss definition dealing with intended loss,5 and, in partic-
ular, a clarifying amendment to that definition adopted effective November 1, 
2015.6  The Law Review’s editors asked me to respond to Mr. Guarnera.  I 
agreed in part because Mr. Guarnera’s central arguments, though vigorously 
expressed, seem to me unpersuasive, but primarily because the invitation pro-
vided me an opportunity to defend the conceptually sound core of a guideline 
that has often, and sometimes deservedly, been the subject of pointed criticism. 
II.  SENTENCING ECONOMIC CRIMES UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: AN INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Brief 
At their core, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a system for assign-
ing to each convicted federal defendant a sentencing range.7  This sentencing 
range is determined by reference to a grid, the vertical axis of which measures 
the seriousness of the offense(s) for which the defendant is being sentenced – 
his or her “offense level” – and the horizontal axis, which measures the defend-
ant’s prior criminal history – his or her “criminal history category.”8  The in-
tersection determined by these two numbers is a range of months – the defend-
ant’s “sentencing range.”9  In addition to rules for determining a sentencing 
range, the Guidelines have provisions concerning the conditions under which, 
 
 3. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Damp Squib: The Disappointing Denouement 
of the Sentencing Commission’s Economic Crime Project (and What They Should Do 
Now), 27 FED. SENT. REP. 270 (2015) [hereinafter Bowman, Damp Squib]; Frank O. 
Bowman, III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. 
SENT. REP. 167 (2008); Frank O. Bowman, III, Economic Crimes: Model Sentencing 
Guidelines §2B1, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 330, 333–34 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious 
History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
373, 431–35 (2004) [hereinafter Bowman, Pour Encourager les Autres]. 
 5. Daniel S. Guarnera, A Fatally Flawed Proxy: The Role of “Intended Loss” in 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud, 81 MO. L. REV. 715 (2016). 
 6. Id. at 745–46. 
 7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016). 
 8. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.1. 
 9. Id. 
2
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according to the Sentencing Commission, judges ought to consider sentencing 
within, above, or below the calculated sentencing range.10 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. 
Booker,11 a properly calculated sentencing range was deemed presumptively 
correct and was thus strongly determinative of the judge’s sentence.12  Once 
Booker transubstantiated the Guidelines from mandatory to advisory, the sen-
tencing range remained, at the least, an influential starting point for a judge’s 
sentencing determination.  Critical to any discussion of the post-Booker era is 
the understanding that the Guidelines, theoretically advisory though they may 
be, retain a powerful effect on the sentences defendants actually receive.  Just 
under half of all sentences are still imposed within the judicially calculated 
guideline range,13 and most sentences imposed outside the applicable range re-
main fairly close to that range.14  Therefore, the Guidelines still matter, and 
discussions about the strengths and weaknesses of particular guideline rules 
retain pressing significance for the defendants sentenced daily in federal courts. 
We are concerned here with a subset of those guideline rules that deter-
mine the “offense level” and thus determine the defendant’s position on the 
vertical axis of the Guidelines’ Sentencing Table.  The vertical axis of the Sen-
tencing Table incorporates a simple proportionality principle: all else being 
equal, a defendant’s sentence should be proportional to the seriousness of his 
offense.15  The more serious the crime, the greater the offense level, and the 
more stringent the recommended punishment.  Of course, the Guidelines have 
provisions that accommodate many sentencing considerations other than of-
fense seriousness, such as the defendant’s criminal history (thought to have a 
bearing both on likelihood of recidivism and blameworthiness for the current 
offense), potential reductions in sentence based on unusual personal circum-
stances or cooperation with the government, the defendant’s choice to plead 
guilty rather than go to trial, and more.16  But this Article addresses only the 
 
 10. Id. ch. 5 pt. K. 
 11. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005) (holding Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines unconstitutional as then applied, but constitutional if construed as advi-
sory).  For a thorough discussion of the Booker opinion, see Frank O. Bowman, III, 
Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It 
Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2010) [hereinafter Bowman, Debacle]. 
 12. Bowman, Debacle, supra note 11, at 425. 
 13. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2015 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, tbl.N (2016) (reporting that in FY 2015, 47.3% of all federal defendants 
were sentenced within the applicable guideline range). 
 14. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1244–50 (2014) [hereinafter 
Bowman, Dead Law]. 
 15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5. pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016). 
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place of the term “loss” in Section 2B1.1, which determines the offense level 
of economic crimes. 
B.  The Economic Crime Guideline – U.S.S.G. §2B1.1: Structure and 
Severity 
The basic structure of Section 2B1.1 remains the same as when the con-
solidated economic crime guideline made its first appearance in 2001 (although 
the Commission has tinkered with it fairly regularly since).17  The total offense 
level of an economic crime defendant is determined by beginning with a base 
offense level of either 6 or 7, depending on the crime of which the defendant 
was convicted,18 then adding a number of offense levels determined by the 
amount of “loss” caused or intended by the defendant,19 and then adding a 
number of offense levels determined by the applicability of other non-loss spe-
cific offense characteristics.20 
The most common post-2001 critiques of the economic crime guideline 
have been, first, that it generates excessively severe sentencing ranges for some 
classes of defendants, and second, that “loss” plays too large a role in sentenc-
ing federal economic offenders.21  I agree, at least somewhat, with both criti-
cisms, which are interrelated. 
As to severity, I have written that “for many, perhaps most, economic 
offenders the Guidelines do not suggest manifestly unreasonable sentences,” 
but “for high-loss defendants the fraud guideline is . . . ‘fundamentally bro-
ken.’”22  Other observers believe that the Guidelines generate excessive sen-
tences even for defendants with lower loss amounts.23  Framed this way, it  
 17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
 18. Id.  Until 2003, the base offense level for all fraud crimes was 6; amendments 
enacted in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 raised that level to 7 for certain 
offenses.  See generally Bowman, Pour Encourager les Autres, supra note 4, at 431–
35 (explaining the scope and genesis of the change to a base offense level of 7 for some 
offenses). 
 19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015) (loss table). 
 20. Id. §§2B1.1(b)(2)–(b)(19).  Additionally, the sum resulting from application 
of the rules in Section 2B1.1 is then adjusted up or down by applying the provisions of 
Chapter Three of the Guidelines for factors like role in the offense, characteristics of 
the victim, and the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, but these provisions apply 
to all offense types and are of only tangential concern to this discussion.  Id. 
 21. Bowman, Dead Law, supra note 14, at 1244–50. 
 22. Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 3, at 270 (quoting Judge Patti Saris, Chair 
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission). 
 23. See, e.g., Statement of Michael Caruso on Behalf of Federal Public and Com-
munity Defenders, Public Hearing on Economic Crime and Inflationary Adjustments 
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sounds as though the problem is with loss itself, but the reality is far more 
subtle. 
When critics of Section 2B1.1 complain that “loss” has too large an im-
pact on sentencing outcomes, their complaint is not primarily about the defini-
tion of loss.  It is instead a complaint that loss, however defined, now adds too 
many offense levels to defendants’ final guideline calculations and thus that 
loss can increase sentence length by unjustifiably large amounts.24  In 1988, a 
first-time offender convicted of mail fraud and sentenced under the original 
fraud guideline, Section 2F1.1, began with a base offense level of 6, meaning 
that, loss and other specific offense characteristics aside, his or her starting 
sentencing range would have been 0-6 months.25  The loss table of Section 
2F1.1 then contained twelve one-offense-level steps that added only a maxi-
mum of eleven levels for loss.26  Therefore, even if a defendant received the 
maximum loss adjustment of eleven levels, the resultant offense level, without 
other specific offense characteristics, would have been 17, equating to a sen-
tencing range of 24-30 months.27 
By contrast, the loss table of the November 2015 version of Section 2B1.1 
has fifteen two-level steps, pursuant to which loss amount can add from two to 
thirty offense levels.28  A first-time offender convicted of mail or wire fraud 
now begins with a base offense level of 7,29 meaning that, loss and other spe-
cific offense characteristics aside, his or her starting sentencing range is 0-6 
months.  Accordingly, if loss can add two to thirty offense levels, then loss 
amount alone can now raise such a defendant’s offense level to 37 and the 
guideline range all the way to 210-262 months (17.5-21.8 years).30 
The inflated significance of loss in the current economic crime guideline 
has been exacerbated by the creeping proliferation of non-loss specific offense 
characteristics.  I have addressed this phenomenon, sometimes referred to as 
“factor creep,” at length elsewhere,31 and I will not repeat the entire analysis 
here.  Stated succinctly, factor creep arises from the interaction of three features 
of the current guideline: (1) the large number of loss level enhancements; (2) 
the steady proliferation of specific offense characteristics, other than loss, that 
can add offense levels on top of the combination of base offense level plus 
loss;32 and (3) the logarithmic structure of the 43-level Sentencing Table, which 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2F1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 1987). 
 26. Id. §2F1.1(b)(1). 
 27. See id. 
 28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015) (loss table). 
 29. Id. §2B1.1(a). 
 30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5 pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2010) (Sentencing Table). 
 31. Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 3, at 277. 
 32. The proliferation of non-loss specific offense characteristics is particularly 
troublesome because many of these SOCs, such as the number of victims, U.S. 
5
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dictates that each increase in offense level has an ever-greater absolute effect 
on sentence length the higher one goes up the Table.33  In practical terms, the 
latter point means that: 
[A]dding one offense level to the total of a first-time offender who pre-
viously had an offense level of 19 . . . increases his minimum sentence 
by 3 months and his maximum by 4 months.  The same one-level in-
crease from an offense level of 30 increases the defendant’s minimum 
sentence by 11 months and his maximum by 14.  And a one-level in-
crease for an offender with an offense level of 36 increases his mini-
mum by 22 months and his maximum by 27.34 
In short, when one adds offense levels based on non-loss specific offense char-
acteristics on top of an already-large offense level number generated purely by 
base offense level plus loss, the resultant final offense level can become unre-
alistically high very fast. 
The solution to this problem has very little to do with the definition of 
loss.  Rather, the Commission should reduce the quantitative impact of loss on 
the final offense level and should take steps to ameliorate the factor creep prob-
lem.  In testimony before the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 2015, I made 
proposals to address both issues.35 
First, I suggested that the Commission should set a maximum limit for 
punishment for economic crime and then reverse engineer the Guidelines to 
distribute sentences rationally below that limit.36  I next suggested that the 
Commission “give the loss table a haircut”37 by eliminating the top four steps 
on the Section 2B1.1 loss table, thus making the maximum loss amount meas-
ured by the table $25 million and the maximum offense level increase for loss 
22 levels.38  However, despite the tentative endorsement of this proposal by a 
representative of the Justice Department, the Commission did not include such 
 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), 
and the enhancements for sophisticated means, §2B1.1(b)(10)(C), large health care 
frauds, §2B1.1(b)(7), $1 million in gross receipts, §2B1.1(b)(16)(A), and participation 
by an officer or director of a company in securities fraud, §2B1.1(b)(19)(A), correlate 
closely with large loss amount, thus further inflating the sentence ranges of high-loss 
defendants. 
 33. Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 3, at 271. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Frank O. Bowman, III, Comment on Proposed Amendments to Economic 
Crime Guideline, § 2B1.1 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/Bow-
man.pdf; Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 3, at 270 (recapitulating my February 2015 
Commission testimony and commenting on economic crime guideline amendments 
adopted in April 2015). 
 36. Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 3, at 277–78. 
 37. Id. at 278. 
 38. Id. at 278–79. 
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a cut in its 2015 guideline amendments.39  Finally, I urged the Commission to 
reduce the number, size, and cumulative impact of the non-loss specific offense 
characteristics of Section 2B1.1.40  The Commission has, to date, taken no steps 
to implement these suggestions,41 nor the even more far-reaching proposals of 
others, such as the American Bar Association.42  Hence, my view of the Com-
mission’s 2015 amendments to the economic crime guideline as a “damp 
squib.”43 
III.  THE PLACE OF “LOSS” IN FEDERAL ECONOMIC CRIME 
SENTENCING 
Even if the Sentencing Commission were to significantly restructure Sec-
tion 2B1.1, any new economic crime guideline would inevitably take account 
of the economic harm caused or intended by defendants.  Thus, “loss” or some-
thing like it will remain a central feature of the economic crime sentencing 
 
 39. Id. at 279.  Ideally, the Commission should go further.  It should reduce the 
total available loss-based offense level enhancements to perhaps 16 or 18, while at the 
same time recalibrating the amounts of loss associated with each step on the loss table 
to achieve a reasonable distribution of defendants along the loss table spectrum.  Doing 
so would generate maximum offense levels and sentencing ranges for first-time offend-
ers based on base offense level and loss amount only of Offense Level 23 (46-57 
months) if a 16-level loss cap were adopted, or Offense Level 25 (57-71 months) if an 
18-level loss cap were adopted. 
  The American Bar Association has proposed a radically revised economic 
crime guideline containing a six-step loss table providing for a maximum offense level 
increase of 14 levels.  American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, Report on 
Behalf of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Task Force on the 
Reform of Federal Sentencing for Economic Crimes, Final Draft (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/eco-
nomic_crimes.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report]. 
 40. Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 3, at 279–80. 
 41. The Commission’s 2015 amendments to §2B1.1 modified the multi-victim en-
hancement, §2B1.1(b)(2), which formerly added 2, 4, and 6 offense levels if an offense 
caused loss to 10, 50, or 250 victims, respectively.  Compare U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014), with U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
The four-level and six-level enhancements are now triggered not merely by victim 
number, but by a finding of five or twenty-five victims who suffered “substantial fi-
nancial hardship.”  §2B1.1(b)(2).  The likely result is that the four- and six-level en-
hancements will rarely be applied because proving substantial financial hardship is dif-
ficult.  This is hardly a meaningful fix to the overall factor creep problem. 
 42. See Written Testimony of James E. Felman on Behalf of the American Bar 
Association Before the United States Sentencing Commission for the Hearing on Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Regarding Economic Crimes 
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/pub-
lic-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/Felman.pdf. 
 43. Bowman, Damp Squib, supra note 3, at 280. 
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calculus, and “loss” will need a legal definition.  That definition is the subject 
of the balance of this Article. 
Section 2B1.1 now states that the “loss” figure to be plugged into the loss 
table will be “the greater of actual or intended loss.”44  “Actual loss” is defined 
as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the of-
fense.”45  From 2001 to 2015, “intended loss” was defined as “the pecuniary 
harm that was intended to result from the offense.”46  Effective November 1, 
2015, the Commission amended the intended loss definition to read “the pecu-
niary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict.”47  Mr. Guarnera’s 
article is focused on the newly amended definition of intended loss, which he 
believes is materially different than the old definition and a bad policy choice.48  
He is mistaken on both counts.  Moreover, his suggested alternative, that “in-
tended loss” be defined in terms of recklessness,49 is theoretically unsound, 
problematic in application, and would, if anything, exacerbate the problem of 
Section 2B1.1’s excessive punitiveness.  By contrast, I think the current defi-
nitions of loss, actual loss, and intended loss are fine as they stand.  They are 
not perfect, of course, either in theory or as applied to every conceivable eco-
nomic offense, but they are fundamentally sound rules of general application.  
To understand why requires stepping back and considering some basics. 
A.  “Loss” as a Measure of Offense Severity 
That the concept of “loss” should be central to federal economic crime 
sentencing seems intuitively obvious.  After all, economic offenses criminalize 
stealing or destroying other people’s stuff.50  They are a legal response to the 
evil of one person designedly doing economic damage to another.  Therefore, 
it seems entirely proper that the larger the economic deprivation, the more se-
rious should be the crime and the more severe its punishment.  However, the 
intuition that larger loss equals more serious crime requires careful scrutiny if 
we are not to lose our way when the issues become more complex, particularly 
in relation to intended loss. 
In American criminal law, offense seriousness ranking schemes are based 
primarily on three factors: the magnitude of any harms actually caused by a 
defendant’s criminal conduct, the magnitude of harms risked by a defendant’s 
 
 44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 45. Id. §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i). 
 46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 48. Guarnera, supra note 5, at 719. 
 49. Id. at 755. 
 50. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 570.030 (West 2017). 
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criminal conduct (sometimes even if they did not occur), and the defendant’s 
culpable mental state.51 
The place of risk of harm in offense seriousness ranking deserves a spe-
cial word.  Criminal law deals with the concept of risk, which is to say the 
probability that particular behavior will cause harm, in a variety of ways.  In 
the case of harms that actually occurred, the riskiness of the defendant’s be-
havior is baked into rules about mental state and rules about causation.52  In 
offense types where the actual harm is very severe, the law may impose crim-
inal liability and punishment not only if the defendant desired or knew of the 
high likelihood of the prohibited harm (mental states the Model Penal Code 
terms purposely, knowingly, or recklessly53), but also if the defendant was not, 
but should have been, aware of a substantial risk of harm (what the Model Pe-
nal Code terms negligence54).  Conversely, if the actual harm against which the 
offense is directed is less severe, then criminal liability may be imposed for 
purposefully or knowingly causing the harm but not for negligent behavior and 
perhaps not even for recklessness.  Homicide, the gravest human transgression, 
is virtually everywhere a crime, whether committed purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly, or negligently.55  Dispossessing another of property, however, is 
almost never criminal unless the defendant harbored an intent to steal, meaning 
a conscious purpose or desire to deprive the victim of ownership or possession 
of something of value.56 
Ideas about risk are also incorporated in criminal causation rules.  In crim-
inal law, a defendant may not be found responsible for a harm unless his or her 
prohibited conduct was both the cause-in-fact and the so-called proximate or 
legal cause of that harm.57  Questions of cause-in-fact are post hoc empirical 
examinations of chains of cause and effect in the physical world.  Therefore, a 
cause-in-fact is sometimes, and more helpfully, termed a “but-for cause” be-
cause the relevant question is whether the harm would have occurred had it not 
been for the defendant’s conduct.58  The doctrine of proximate or legal cause 
insists that criminal defendants not be held legally accountable for harms that 
concededly resulted from their conduct, but were not foreseeable in advance.59  
Proximate cause is an inquiry into the moral connection between risk and legal 
blameworthiness, in which we take the defendant’s causal contribution to harm 
 
 51. There may also be a fourth factor – perceived recidivism risk – at work in the 
ranking of some crimes.  For example, sex crimes are commonly punished very se-
verely, at least in part based on the perception (correct or not) that sex offenders as a 
class have a particularly high recidivism rate. 
 52. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also id. § 2.03. 
 53. Id. § 2.02(2) (defining purposely, knowingly, and recklessly). 
 54. Id. (defining negligently). 
 55. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31 (7th ed. 
2015) (law of criminal homicide). 
 56. Id. § 32.02 (law of theft). 
 57. Id. § 14 (law of causation). 
 58. Id. § 14.02[A] (defining “but-for” cause). 
 59. Id. § 14.03 (defining proximate cause). 
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as a given, but try to assess the situation before the defendant acted and ask 
how likely the harm would have seemed to a reasonable person in the defend-
ant’s shoes.60  The requirement of proximate cause recognizes the moral con-
nection between blameworthiness and risk by declaring that people should not 
be held criminally culpable for extremely low probability events. 
The law customarily punishes causing harm carelessly less seriously than 
inflicting harm designedly.  Reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent 
homicide are less serious crimes than premeditated murder.61  But sometimes 
the criminal law treats a foreseeable but unintended harm just as seriously as if 
the defendant had desired to cause that harm.  Indeed, there is a sort of default 
presumption embodied in several major criminal law doctrines that if a defend-
ant makes a conscious choice to do evil or violate the law, and the resultant 
harm to others turns out far worse than the defendant anticipated, then the law 
will nonetheless hold the defendant responsible for the unanticipated bad con-
sequence. 
For example, the felony murder rule commonly imposes liability for the 
most serious grade of homicide on a defendant who kills someone in the course 
of committing or fleeing from, say, a robbery, even if the death was the wholly 
accidental result of striking a pedestrian with a car while driving away from 
the bank.62  Such a defendant must be shown to have the intent to commit rob-
bery (to take property from the person or presence of another by force or fear), 
but need not be shown to have any culpable mental state with regard to the 
pedestrian, not even common negligence.63 
Similarly, the Pinkerton doctrine imposes liability on each member of a 
conspiracy for the crimes committed by all the other members, even if such 
crimes were unknown to the other members, so long as such crimes were fore-
seeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy.64  Likewise, at common law and 
in many states, complicity doctrine imposes liability for the crimes committed 
by one’s accomplices so long as such crimes were the foreseeable consequence 
of the crime to which the defendant was an accomplice.65  In all these instances, 
the law is making statements about the moral connection between risk and 
blameworthiness, saying, in effect, that one who consciously chooses evil can-
not fairly complain if he is blamed and punished for harm that actually resulted 
from his choice and was within the zone of foreseeable risk. 
Ideas about risk of harm also significantly influence the law of inchoate 
offenses.  As I wrote many years ago: 
[W]e punish unconsummated efforts to cause harm as “attempts” or 
“conspiracies” (albeit usually less severely than completed crimes) so 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. § 31.10. 
 62. See generally id. § 31.06 (discussing felony murder). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946). 
 65. DRESSLER, supra note 55, §§ 30.05[B][3], 30.09[2][d]. 
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long as the would-be perpetrator has come close enough to success that 
we can be confident his malignant designs were real and not mere fan-
tasy, and thus that his conduct was morally blameworthy.  [W]e punish 
the unsuccessful criminal, not only because he deserves it, but because 
his frustrated plans present a high enough risk of actual harm that pun-
ishment for the purpose of deterrence is warranted.66 
Different offense types emphasize different combinations of harm, risk of 
harm, and mental state.  Different permutations of these factors make one crime 
type more serious than another.  For example, all homicide crimes share the 
same harm – death – so they are ranked almost entirely on the defendant’s 
mental state in relation to the death his conduct caused, from something like 
premeditation at the high end of the scale, to criminal negligence at the low 
end.  By contrast, inchoate crimes like attempts and unsuccessful conspiracies 
produce no actual harm and thus, by definition, can be ranked only in consid-
eration of mental state and harm risked.  And crimes like the various grades of 
assault can produce a spectrum of actual harms, from fright to permanent 
maiming, can involve mental states ranging from purposeful infliction of injury 
to mere recklessness, and can also involve an unrealized risk of additional in-
jury due to the defendant’s choice of weapon. 67  Accordingly, statutory ranking 
schemes for assaults customarily involve multiple permutations of harm,68 risk 
of harm, and mental state. 
Matters become still more complicated when we try to rank the serious-
ness of particular incidents of crime within a crime type.  This point is critical 
to thinking about the provisions of the federal Guidelines that seek to quantify 
in a single number – the “offense level” – the relative seriousness of every 
crime of every defendant.  Virtually all states have a system of offense classi-
fication that slots each statutorily defined crime into an offense seriousness 
category (e.g., Class A, B, C, or D or Class 1, 2, 3, or 4) carrying a designated 
maximum and minimum sentence.  In such systems, sentencing judges may be 
left on their own in comparing the relative seriousness of two cases of first 
degree assault, but at least they know that the legislature considers a first degree 
assault more serious than a second degree assault and what sentence ranges the 
legislature thinks appropriate for those crimes.  Likewise, state systems of of-
fense classification help judges rank offense seriousness across crime types.  If 
 
 66. Bowman, Coping with “Loss,” supra note 2, at 559 (footnote omitted). 
 67. See, e.g., the Missouri second degree assault statute, MO. ANN. STAT. § 
565.052 (West 2017), which includes two forms that involve the use of deadly weapons 
or firearms. 
 68. Compare, e.g., the Missouri first degree assault statute, MO. ANN. STAT. § 
565.050(1), which defines one form of first degree assault as occurring if the defendant 
“knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to another person,” with 
the Missouri third degree assault statute, MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.054(1), which includes 
a form of third degree assault occurring when the defendant “knowingly causes physi-
cal injury to another person.” 
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a first degree burglary is a Class 1 felony, and manslaughter is a Class 2, the 
judge knows which crime the legislature views as more serious. 
The absence of a basic ranking scheme for crimes is a major deficiency 
of the federal criminal code.  Federal statutory law has neither meaningful 
standard offense classifications nor standardized penalty ranges.  Therefore, to 
create an offense seriousness scale useful in sentencing individual defendants, 
the Guidelines’ drafters not only had to decide for themselves the relative se-
verity of different crime types like murder, robbery, fraud, and drug trafficking, 
but in order to rank offenders within each crime type, they had to identify and 
quantify the relative importance of offense-specific, non-element facts relevant 
to harm, risk of harm, and mental state.  Only by doing this could the Guide-
lines produce for each criminal incident a single composite numerical meas-
urement of offense seriousness. 
B.  “Loss” in Guidelines Section 2B1.1 
The nearly insuperable challenge posed to the aspiring drafter of a unitary 
guideline for federal economic crimes is that such a guideline must impose a 
single ranking scheme on tens of thousands of wildly disparate cases involving 
virtually every means by which one person can cheat, steal, embezzle, defraud, 
despoil, or otherwise deprive another of economic value.  Moreover, not only 
did Congress fail to provide statutory seriousness rankings for the many eco-
nomic offenses in the federal code, but it wrote them so that virtually every 
offense has effectively the same mental state – some variant of the intent to 
deprive another of something of value.69  Accordingly, the Sentencing Com-
mission was obliged to identify, without any useful legislative guidance, fac-
tors relating to harm, risk of harm, and mental state that make one economic 
crime worse than another.  Loss has assumed the dominant role in economic 
crime sentencing because, as defined in Section 2B1.1, it is a direct or proxy 
measurement for all three of these determinants of offense seriousness.70 
 
 69. Congress was following long Anglo-American practice in which the so-called 
common law property crimes of larceny, false pretenses, and embezzlement all had 
mental states equating to intent to deprive another of a thing of value.  See DRESSLER, 
supra note 55, § 32.07 (required mental state for larceny is intent to steal); id. § 
32.09[B] (required mental state for embezzlement is intent to deprive another of prop-
erty permanently); id. § 32.10[C][3] (required mental state for false pretenses is intent 
to defraud). 
 70. One minor deficiency in Mr. Guarnera’s article is that he oversimplifies the 
function of actual loss in the sentencing calculus, asserting categorically that loss is a 
proxy for “the seriousness of the offense.”  Guarnera, supra note 5, at 736.  This for-
mulation is wrong because: (1) loss is a direct, not a proxy, measurement of harm; (2) 
loss is also a proxy measurement for both mental state and one aspect of risk; and (3) 
he equates “seriousness” with “harm” when offense seriousness, whether in economic 
or other crime types, is a complex amalgam of harm, mental state, risk, and other fac-
tors. 
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1.  Actual Loss 
The Guidelines define actual loss as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuni-
ary harm that resulted from an offense.”71  On the one hand, it is a nearly perfect 
measurement of harm – indeed, it is the harm against which economic crime 
statutes are directed.  But it is more than that.  Stealing a lot is worse than 
stealing a little not only because a large theft causes more harm to the victim 
than a small theft, but also because the thief’s desire, or at least willingness, to 
cause a large harm rather than a small one is a signifier of his evil mind and 
increases his blameworthiness and, with it, the sense that he deserves more 
punishment. 
Relatedly, judges have traditionally found economic criminals who en-
gage in significant planning activities to possess a state of mind more culpable 
than the statutory minimum requirement of a momentary or transitory intent to 
steal.72  Although the correlation is not a perfect one, dishonest schemes that 
cause large losses are apt to have required more planning activity than those 
that cause small losses.  Accordingly, actual loss acts not only as a direct meas-
ure of harm inflicted, but as an important proxy measurement of mental state – 
a critical determinant of relative blameworthiness. 
Finally, actual loss as defined in Section 2B1.1 incorporates one of the 
aspects of risk analysis considered above.  It imposes sentencing consequences 
for actual loss only when the defendant has (1) been convicted of a crime with 
the mental state of desiring to deprive another of economic value and (2) caused 
economic harm of a type and extent that a reasonable person could foresee as 
within the sphere of risk of that crime. 
At this point, the astute reader may fairly object that while actual loss may 
be a decent proxy for a defendant’s evil mind if the pecuniary harms included 
in actual loss are those sought or at least consciously anticipated by the defend-
ant, the Guidelines’ reasonable foreseeability standard is over-inclusive be-
cause it attributes to defendants harms they neither expressly desired nor even 
consciously anticipated as following from their criminal conduct.  This criti-
cism is not without some force, but I think it overstated for at least three rea-
sons. 
First, the harm actually inflicted by criminal conduct is customarily the 
dominant yardstick of offense seriousness, with variations in mental state and 
risk assuming subordinate roles.  Actual loss is primarily a direct measure of 
harm inflicted on victims and only secondarily a proxy measure of the defend-
ant’s mental culpability.73  The fact that a defendant set out to steal only a little 
 
 71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 72. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 93–94 (1988). 
 73. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (“‘Actual loss’ means the reasonably foreseeable pecuni-
ary harm that resulted from the offense.”). 
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but set in train a foreseeable series of events that cost victims a lot does nothing 
to reduce the real financial damage to the victims.  Moreover, as just noted, in 
the criminal law we routinely convict people of crimes when they consciously 
seek to cause one type or degree of harm but actually cause a greater, though 
foreseeable, harm than the one intended. 
Second, in the overwhelming majority of federal economic crime cases, 
the actual loss is precisely the money or property the defendant set out to and 
did in fact steal from the victim.74  Telemarketers convince their marks to send 
money in payment for nonexistent, worthless, or overvalued goods or ser-
vices.75  Perpetrators of health care fraud bill victim insurance companies or 
government health care programs for unnecessary or overpriced medicines, 
tests, or procedures, unlawfully enriching themselves in the amounts the vic-
tims pay.76  Those who fraudulently obtain government benefits or cheat the 
government procurement process illegally take money from the government 
and put it in their own pockets.77  The object of credit card, stolen check, and 
identity theft crimes is to transfer money from credit card holders or issuers, 
bank account owners, and others to the defendants.78  In such cases, foreseea-
bility is simply not a material issue inasmuch as actual loss is the amount de-
signedly – and thus by definition, foreseeably – obtained by the defendant from 
the individual or institutional victim (less some offsets for value transferred 
from the defendant to the victim as part of the fraudulent scheme79). 
Third, in most economic crime cases where the loss does not equal the 
defendant’s gain, the loss suffered by the victim – even if not subjectively de-
sired by the defendant – occurred because the defendant’s fraud circumvented 
precautions the victim took to prevent a loss of precisely that type.  A classic 
example is a simple loan fraud in which the defendant lies on a loan application 
about a matter like his assets, salary, or employment.  Even if the defendant 
hopes (“intends”) to repay the loan, he lies because he knows the lender would 
not loan the money in the absence of the lie, precisely because the lender would 
not be willing to assume the enhanced risk of non-payment that a truthful state-
ment of the defendant’s financial condition would present. 
 
 74. Id. §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(III). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 1999) (de-
scribing a “one-in-five” telemarketing in which victims are told they have won a valu-
able prize and pressured to send money for an overvalued promotional product). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. McLean, 715 F.3d 129, 145 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
loss included payments to defendant for unnecessary medical procedures and follow-
up tests). 
 77. See ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK O. BOWMAN, III & JENNIFER WOLL, 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK, § 2B1.1, Authors’ Discussion § 37 
(2015–2016 ed.) (discussing loss in frauds against the government). 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 79. HAINES, BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 77, § 2B1.1, Authors’ Discussion § 37 
(discussing the principle that actual loss is net loss to the victim). 
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Of course, even in a simple loan fraud, the magnitude of the loss actually 
inflicted may be greater than the magnitude of the risk the defendant con-
sciously contemplated at the outset.  This is often true in loan frauds that coin-
cide with financial downturns that cause the value of collateral to decline to an 
unusual degree.  But again, it is precisely to guard against the risk of loss oc-
casioned by declines in collateral value that lenders insist on accurate infor-
mation about the borrower’s capacity to repay the loan independent of foreclo-
sure on collateral.  To put the matter in criminal law terms, lenders want assur-
ance of borrowers’ capacity to repay because market fluctuations, even very 
large market fluctuations, are entirely “foreseeable.”  It is hardly unfair to pun-
ish a defendant based on the magnitude of an actual loss when the defendant 
consciously subverted safeguards erected by the victim to prevent precisely 
that rare but predictable type of loss.  And the foreseeability limitation on loss 
provides an avenue of relief in cases where market fluctuations or other factors 
affecting loss amount really were so abnormal that the degree of loss was un-
foreseeable to a reasonable person, thus making punishment on that basis un-
fair. 
Insurance fraud provides illustrations of both the foregoing points.  Insur-
ance fraud is of two basic types: (1) fraud by insureds who make false insurance 
claims and collect money to which they are not entitled and (2) fraud by in-
surors selling fraudulent insurance coverage, which is to say collecting premi-
ums for false promises to provide insurance coverage.80 
The actual loss to insurors in cases of fraud by insureds is the amount 
improperly paid to crooked claimants – money the claimants sought for them-
selves and illegally obtained directly from the victim insuror.81 
The actual loss in cases of fraud by insurors includes both the premiums 
paid by insureds to the dishonest insuror,82 and in some instances where the 
insuror fails to honor a contractually valid claim, the amount of the benefits 
that should have been paid by the insuror to the insured.83  The premiums are  
 80. A more nuanced version of this type of fraud involves sale of insurance by 
entities that have misrepresented their own solvency or reserves and thus deceived in-
sureds about their ability to pay claims.  See, e.g., United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 
1104, 1106 (3d Cir. 1995), amended (Jan. 29, 1996), amended by 79 F.3d 14 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 81. United States v. Jackson, 696 F.2d 578, 592 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Rennert, 374 F.3d 206, 211–13 (3d Cir. 2004), va-
cated in part sub nom., Miller v. United States, 544 U.S. 958 (2005). 
 83. There is some dispute over whether the amount of valid unpaid claims should 
always be counted as loss in an insurance fraud case.  Compare United States v. Cros-
grove, 637 F.3d 646, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the proper measurement of 
loss was the amount of the fraudulently obtained premiums, rather than the amount of 
the unpaid claims), with Neadle, 72 F.3d at 1108–11 (holding that the loss in a case 
where an insurer obtained a license to sell insurance by misrepresenting its reserves 
was the amount of the unpaid claims).  See also United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 
442, 459 (3d Cir. 1999) and United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d 1257, 1269–70 (5th 
Cir. 1996).  In Crosgrove, the amount of the premiums was substantially larger than 
the amount of the unpaid claims, and the court’s ruling seems primarily to have been a 
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actual loss because they are funds dishonestly inveigled from the insured and 
paid to the insuror.  By contrast, an unpaid claim adds no money to the insuror’s 
pocketbook but nonetheless deprives the insured of money he or she had a right 
to expect by virtue of having taken the precaution of buying insurance to guard 
against a foreseeable risk of financial harm.  Again, it is perfectly just to punish 
a defendant based on the occurrence of a financial harm whose foreseeability 
was so plain that the victim paid the defendant money to insure against it. 
Fourth, the subset of fraud cases in which criticisms of the actual loss 
definition have the most traction is small, and in many of those cases, the crit-
icism would be better addressed by specialized rules for special fraud types.  
For example, many criticisms of the foreseeability component of the actual loss 
rule arise in fraud-on-the-market cases in which loss is measured by decline in 
stock price and the issue is less foreseeability than but-for causation.84 
Fifth, another common complaint about actual loss arises in cases where 
the loss is large, but the criminal role of a particular defendant seems relatively 
small.  The solution to this difficulty (when it manifests itself in an unjustly 
harsh sentencing range and is not merely an expression of the personal distress 
of a defendant faced with a long sentence for aiding a big fraud) is a reduction 
in the size of the loss table and solutions to the factor creep problem, as pro-
posed above, in combination with application of the existing adjustments for 
mitigating role in U.S.S.G. §3B1.2.85  A minor role adjustment reduces a de-
fendant’s total offense level by four levels, which reduces the sentencing range 
by one-third or more.86  If the offense level generated by application of the loss 
and specific offense characteristic provisions of Section 2B1.1 were scaled rea-
sonably, a one-third reduction for a minor role should justly account for a de-
fendant’s relatively small contribution to a large crime. 
At all events, the current rule limiting actual loss to reasonably foreseea-
ble pecuniary harm is a reasonable midpoint between a regime that unduly lim-
ited loss to only pecuniary harms that both occurred and were desired by the 
defendant and a far more expansive regime that would assign sentencing con-
sequences to any loss caused by defendant’s crime, regardless of whether that 
loss was foreseen by, or even foreseeable to, a reasonable person. 
2.  Intended Loss 
So long as the economic crime guideline retains as one of its central com-
ponents a measurement of the magnitude of the economic harm actually caused  
means of denying the defendant an undeserved sentencing windfall.  637 F.3d at 664, 
667–68. 
 84. The ABA has suggested that “certain types of securities offenses where 
changes in the value of market capitalization drive the loss calculation may be espe-
cially suited for consideration under a separate guideline.”  ABA Task Force Report, 
supra note 39, at 9. 
 85. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
 86. Id. §3B1.2(a). 
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by a defendant’s criminal behavior, an “intended loss” rule (or something like 
it) will be required.  This is so because many, perhaps most, of the federal 
statutes governing economic crime are inchoate offenses in that they are pros-
ecutable and punishable even if the defendants did not achieve their criminal 
aims and caused no actual economic harm.87 
For example, the two most commonly prosecuted federal economic 
crimes, mail and wire fraud, are committed whenever a defendant, “having de-
vised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or prom-
ises,” either mails a letter (mail fraud) or sends an interstate or international 
wire, radio, or television communication (wire fraud) for the purpose of exe-
cuting the scheme.88  Note that unlike common law property offenses such as 
larceny, embezzlement, or false pretenses, in which no crime is committed un-
less the defendant successfully deprives the victim of some possessory or own-
ership interest in property, wire and mail fraud are complete and prosecutable 
the moment the defendant devises a scheme to defraud and sends a letter or 
wire communication in furtherance of the scheme.89  The putative victim of the 
scheme need lose nothing for the crime to be legally complete.  The primary 
federal bank fraud, health care fraud, and securities statutes all have similar 
structures; in each case, the gravamen of the crime is devising a “scheme or 
artifice to defraud” and either executing or attempting to execute it.90  In addi-
tion, the basic federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, makes it a crime to 
“conspire either to commit any other offense against the United States, or to 
defraud the United States.”91  In conspiracy cases, the crime is the formation 
of the agreement, not the success of the conspiratorial venture.92 
The design of all these statutes means that the universe of persons con-
victed of federal economic crimes will include a great many whose criminal 
plans to divest others of their worldly goods failed, or were at most only par-
tially successful.  A federal guidelines system must therefore include a yard-
stick for slotting wholly or partially unsuccessful economic criminals into its 
structure for ranking offense seriousness.  Such a yardstick must not only em-
ploy a metric for comparing wholly or partially unsuccessful swindlers to each 
 
 87. DRESSLER, supra note 55, § 27.02[D] (“Most jurisdictions provide in some 
form that a ‘person is guilty of a criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a crime, 
the person engages in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward the commis-
sion of that crime whether or not his intention is accomplished.’”). 
 88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud).  See 
also 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (outlining major fraud against the United States, which has the 
same structure). 
 89. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud). 
 90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (health care fraud); and 
18 U.S.C. § 1348 (securities and commodities fraud). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
 92. DRESSLER, supra note 55, § 29.04[A] (“The gist – or ‘essence’ – of a conspir-
acy is the agreement to commit an unlawful act or series of such acts.”). 
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other, but that metric should mesh seamlessly with the metric for ranking 
wholly or partially successful economic offenders. 
Viewed from this angle, the Sentencing Commission’s choice to include 
“intended loss” as an alternative means of measuring “loss” makes perfect 
sense.  As discussed below, actual loss and intended loss are justifiable as 
measures of crime seriousness on somewhat different, if overlapping, grounds.  
But both concepts generate a dollar figure that plugs comfortably into a single 
loss table, thus solving rather neatly the Guidelines’ design problem of how to 
rank the relative seriousness of a class of crimes that includes completed, par-
tially completed, and wholly unsuccessful criminal ventures.  Of course, the 
Guidelines’ use of intended loss, either generally or as currently defined, can-
not be justified purely on the ground of administrative convenience.  It must 
stand or fall on its merits, to which we now turn. 
C.  The Theory of Intended Loss as a Measure of Offense Seriousness 
The theoretical rationale for including intended loss as one measurement 
of offense seriousness is straightforward.  At its most basic, intended loss is a 
means of ranking economic crimes that are inchoate in the sense of having 
caused no pecuniary loss.  In such cases, actual harm is unavailable as an of-
fense seriousness grading factor.  However, intended loss is an excellent metric 
for comparing the culpable mental states of economic crime defendants and is 
also a valuable proxy for assessing the other measurement of offense serious-
ness, risk of harm. 
The mental state required for conviction of virtually all federal economic 
crimes is a variant of an intent or purpose to deprive the victim of something 
of value.  If defendants are to be differentiated by mental state, it can only be 
through identification of facts relevant to mental state that are not elements of 
the crime, i.e., beyond the simple fact that the defendant had the intent to steal 
something from somebody.  For crimes directed at vindicating the infliction of 
pecuniary harm, it makes perfect sense to rank defendants’ mental culpability 
– and thus the relative seriousness of their offenses – by determining the size 
of the pecuniary harm each defendant sought to inflict.93 
That said, it is also important to recognize that the law criminalizes and 
punishes inchoate crimes not only because those who try and fail to do bad 
things possess guilty minds, but because, if they combine a desire to do evil 
with the performance of sufficient conduct to render them criminally liable, 
they present a societally unacceptable risk of accomplishing actual harm.  That 
being so, it is reasonable to presume that a defendant who desires to cause a 
large harm presents a larger economic risk to society than a defendant who 
desires to cause a small one.  As I wrote when Section 2B1.1 was first adopted, 
 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“Limiting intended loss to that which was likely or possible . . . would eliminate the 
distinction between a defendant whose only ambition was to make some pocket change 
and one who plotted a million-dollar fraud.”). 
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“From the utilitarian perspective, use of intended loss imposes punishment 
consequences (and thus, one hopes, achieves a deterrent effect) proportional to 
the degree of risk the defendant’s behavior posed to the economic well-being 
of his fellow citizens, as measured by the magnitude of his criminal objec-
tives.”94  Hence, intended loss is a valuable proxy measurement for risk of eco-
nomic harm. 
D.  The Definition of “Intended Loss” in Section 2B1.1 
When the consolidated economic crime guideline, Section 2B1.1, was en-
acted in 2001, it defined intended loss as “the pecuniary harm that was intended 
to result from the offense.”95  Effective November 1, 2015, the Sentencing 
Commission amended the definition to read “the pecuniary harm the defendant 
purposely sought to inflict.” 96  The occasion for this Article is a response to 
Mr. Guarnera.  A central premise of his argument is that the 2015 amendment 
materially changed the definition of intended loss.97  Mr. Guarnera implies that, 
prior to the 2015 amendment, intended loss either was defined by the Guide-
lines to include, or was construed by a substantial body of case law to include, 
losses that did not occur and were not desired by the defendant but were made 
more probable by defendant’s conduct.  This is simply not the case.  To the 
contrary, the 2015 amendment was intended by the Commission to reaffirm the 
original meaning of the 2001 definition, to wit, intended loss embraces only 
those pecuniary harms the defendant subjectively desired to occur, and to 
squelch a small, but troublesome, strain of case law that risked muddying the 
waters.98 
There is little question that the 2001 definition of intended loss was meant 
by the Commission to embrace only harms subjectively intended by the de-
fendant.  This had been the overwhelming majority position even under the old 
regime of separate guidelines for theft and fraud.99  It was also the position 
embraced during the process of drafting consolidated Section 2B1.1.  I can say 
this with some confidence because the operative core of the 2001 definition 
(“the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from” the offense) is drawn 
directly from the draft definition of intended loss submitted to the Sentencing 
Commission by the Criminal Law Committee of the United States Judicial 
 
 94. Bowman, 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms, supra note 2, 
at 77. 
 95. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.2(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2001). 
 96. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 97. See, e.g., Guarnera, supra note 5, at 719 (arguing that “the new ‘purposeful 
loss’ amendment . . . is likely to make the ‘fit’ between [culpability and intended loss] 
even more problematic by excluding a significant range of highly culpable conduct”). 
 98. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
25, 28 (Apr. 30, 2015) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
 99. See Bowman, Coping With “Loss,” supra note 2, at 560–61. 
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Conference, to which I served as academic advisor.100  Moreover, the words 
themselves are not readily susceptible of any other interpretation.101 
Both before and since 2001, the overwhelming majority of courts have 
interpreted the intended loss definition as including only harms the defendant 
subjectively intended,102 as distinct from a regime in which the defendant is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.  Several 
courts have employed this presumption in intended loss cases,103 but most such 
cases are of little consequence because, properly applied, the presumption is 
merely a statement of a reasonable evidentiary inference.  When determining a  
 100. Bowman, Judicious Solution, supra note 2, at 490. 
 101. Mr. Guarnera characterizes the 2001 definition as “flimsy.”  Guarnera, supra 
note 5, at 745.  I have to take exception, even if no offense.  The phrasing does suffer 
stylistically from employing the passive voice.  I would have preferred the straightfor-
ward phraseology of my own original formulation of the definition (“pecuniary harms 
the defendant intended to cause”).  Bowman, Coping With “Loss,” supra note 2, at 577.  
But one has to work pretty hard to interpret it to mean anything other than loss the 
defendant intended (i.e., subjectively desired) to result from the crime he committed. 
 102. See United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2008) (key to 
determining intended loss is defendant’s subjective intent); United States v. Diallo, 710 
F.3d 147, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 509 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (finding intended loss was $20 million face amount of counterfeit checks, 
but treating face amount only as prima facie evidence of defendant’s intent which she 
might have offered evidence to rebut), amended (Aug. 25, 2003); United States v. Sand-
ers, 343 F.3d 511, 527 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ur case law requires the government prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had the subjective intent to cause 
the loss . . . .”); United States v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 1995) (remanding 
for finding on whether defendant subjectively intended to repay loan); United States v. 
Hill, 42 F.3d 914, 918 (5th Cir. 1995) (“When reviewing the calculation of an intended 
loss, we look to actual, not constructive, intent, and distinguish between cases in which 
‘the intended loss for stolen or fraudulently obtained property is the face value of that 
property’ and those in which the intended loss is zero because ‘the defendant intends 
to repay the loan or replace the property.’” (quoting United States v. Henderson, 19 
F.3d 917, 928 (5th Cir. 1994))); United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1427 (6th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Middlebrook, 553 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Berheide, 421 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mutuc, 349 F.3d 930, 
937 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that defendant’s “state of mind is the relevant benchmark”); 
United States v. Fearman, 297 F.3d 660, 661 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he relevant under-
standing of values for purposes of determining intended loss under the sentencing 
guidelines is that of the criminal, not that of the victim.” (citing United States v. 
Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir. 1999))); United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 
490 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1048 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he term [intended] means exactly what it says: to be included . . . the intended loss 
must have been an object of the defendant’s purpose.”). 
 103. United States v. Alli, 444 F.3d 34, 38–39 (1st Cir. 2006) (using presumption 
to find in stolen credit card case that intended loss was total credit limits of the stolen 
cards); United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2002) (relying on maxim 
that a defendant “is presumed to intend the natural and ‘probable’ consequences of [his 
or her] acts” to determine intended loss (alteration in original) (quoting United States 
v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 1997))). 
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defendant’s intent with respect to loss, a court may properly draw reasonable 
inferences about the defendant’s state of mind from his conduct and its fore-
seeable effects.104 
As Mr. Guarnera notes, several First Circuit cases seem to go further and 
embrace an objective test pursuant to which intended loss includes not only 
pecuniary harm the defendant personally desired to occur, but harms a reason-
able person in the defendant’s position would have anticipated.105  In United 
States v. Innarelli, the court wrote that intended loss 
is a term of art meaning the loss the defendant reasonably expected to 
occur at the time he perpetrated the fraud. . . . [W]e focus our loss in-
quiry for purposes of determining a defendant’s offense level on the 
objectively reasonable expectation of a person in his position at the time 
he perpetrated the fraud, not on his subjective intentions or hopes.106 
And in United States v. McCoy, the court said that “‘expected’ would be a bet-
ter term” for its approach to intended loss.107  The First Circuit’s choice of 
language suggests an affinity for the objective view of intended loss stronger 
than any other court.  But these cases are less consequential than they appear. 
In the first place, the Innarelli decision should never have been framed as 
an intended loss case.  It involved a “land-flipping” mortgage fraud in which 
defendants bought cheap properties, induced financially weak buyers to pur-
chase the properties at inflated values, and then induced lenders to make high-
risk loans secured by over-valued collateral to buyers who had a limited ability 
to repay.108  Under Section 2B1.1, Application Note 3E, actual loss in such 
cases is the unpaid balance of the fraudulently obtained loan, less either the 
amount recovered by the lender in foreclosure of the property or, if the collat-
eral has not been sold by the time of sentencing, the fair market value of the 
property at that time.109  Despite speaking in terms of intended loss, the district 
and appellate courts in Innarelli in fact applied this actual loss rule.  The district 
court used the price the swindlers originally paid for the properties as a measure 
of fair market value,110 but there was nothing objectionable in this approach.  
 
 104. United States v. Himler, 355 F.3d 735, 741 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 490 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Absent other evidence of the defendant’s 
intent, the size of the maximum loss that a fraud could have caused is circumstantial 
evidence of the intended loss which satisfies the preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard.”); United States v. Bolla, 346 F.3d 1148, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 105. Guarnera, supra note 5, at 736–37. 
 106. United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 290–91 (1st Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 107. United States v. McCoy, 508 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 108. Innarelli, 524 F.3d at 290–91. 
 109. For further discussion of loss in mortgage frauds, see HAINES, BOWMAN & 
WOLL, supra note 77, at 435–40. 
 110. Innarelli, 524 F.3d at 291. 
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In short, the appellate court’s discussion of intended loss was completely un-
necessary. 
McCoy is a nearly identical land-flip case in which the district court used 
the same loss calculation as the Innarelli judge, including treating the price 
originally paid for the property by the defendant as the value of the collateral 
credit.111  On appeal, the defendant argued that, under the actual loss rule, he 
should have received credit not merely for the amount he originally paid for 
the properties, but in some instances for larger amounts the bank actually re-
covered through foreclosure prior to sentencing.112  The First Circuit agreed 
with the defendant that his was the proper interpretation of the rule for actual 
loss.113  However, it upheld the trial court’s decision as an application of in-
tended loss, concluding that, at the time of the crime, the defendant had no 
reason to expect the property he was flipping would become more valuable 
than the price he paid for it, and thus that his expectations were that the bank 
would never recover a larger amount.114  At most, the McCoy court is saying 
that the loss a defendant expects will result from his crime is the loss he intends 
to cause. 
One can split definitional hairs and conclude that this view of “intent” is 
more akin to Model Penal Code “knowledge” – the defendant is aware “that it 
is practically certain that his conduct will cause . . . a result”115 – than to Model 
Penal Code “purposefulness” – the defendant’s “conscious object [is] to . . . 
cause such a result.”116  But to say that a defendant “expected” a loss at the 
time of his crime is nonetheless to assert that he consciously contemplated that 
result, concluded that it was highly probable, and chose to offend anyway.  That 
is a subjective, not an objective, standard.  It is also, from both a moral and 
evidentiary perspective, so nearly indistinguishable from desiring the loss as to 
fit seamlessly into any workaday definition of “intended loss.” 
For a period, the Tenth Circuit produced a line of questionable cases hold-
ing that the government may prove “intended loss” by showing either “that the 
defendant realistically intended a particular loss, or that a loss in that amount 
was probable.”117  The difficulty, of course, is that mere probability of loss is 
not equivalent to an intention to cause it.  As noted above, the existence of a 
high probability of loss resulting from a defendant’s conduct may be good ev-
idence of an intention to cause loss, but there is no warrant in the Guidelines 
for making proof of probability a substitute for proving purpose.  Recognizing 
the difficulties in this approach, in 2009, the Tenth Circuit insisted that the 
government show not merely that a loss was probable, but that the defendant 
 
 111. McCoy, 508 F.3d at 79. 
 112. Id. at 78–79. 
 113. Id. at 79. 
 114. Id. 
 115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 116. Id. § 2.02(2)(a)(i). 
 117. United States v. Schild, 269 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting United 
States v. Nichols, 229 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
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knew of its probability.118  And in United States v. Manatau, the Tenth Circuit 
came full circle, holding that, “‘[i]ntended loss’ does not mean a loss that the 
defendant merely knew would result from his scheme or a loss he might have 
possibly and potentially contemplated,” and firmly repudiating the notion that 
intended loss means anything other than “a loss the defendant purposely sought 
to inflict.”119 
The Sentencing Commission’s 2015 amendment to the intended loss def-
inition expressly embraced the approach of the Manatau opinion,120 and in so 
doing, merely pulled a few straying courts back in line with the long-standing 
interpretation of intended loss.   
Mr. Guarnera seemingly disagrees with the Commission’s decision.  If I 
understand him correctly, he proposes that intended loss include – and defend-
ants’ sentences be enhanced for – two classes of loss that did not actually hap-
pen: (1) those the defendant desired to inflict, and (2) those as to which the 
defendant was reckless,121 i.e., losses that never happened but were made more 
likely by defendant’s conduct and the defendant was aware of the increased 
risk when committing his offense.  This proposal is flawed on multiple 
grounds. 
To begin, it bears repeating that intended loss is a measurement of losses 
that never happened.  The primary justification for enhancing a defendant’s 
sentence for such unrealized harms is that mental state is such an important 
measure of blameworthiness that proof of a purpose to cause a particular quan-
tum of harm is, standing alone, an acceptable component of the offense seri-
ousness calculus.  Mr. Guarnera’s proposal is that defendants’ sentences be 
increased for harms that not only never happened, but that the defendant never 
wanted to happen.122  It is one thing to increase punishment, even in the absence 
of harm, for harboring the most serious class of culpable mental state – purpose 
to cause a specified harm – but quite another to increase punishment in the 
absence of harm, based purely on a far less serious class of culpable mental 
state – acting with the knowledge that one’s conduct creates risk. 
Mr. Guarnera views added punishment as warranted for the reckless cre-
ation even of unrealized risks.123  But at least from the perspective of substan-
tive criminal law, his suggestion is without obvious precedent.  There are 
scarcely any offenses that criminalize pure recklessness in the absence of a 
resultant harm.  The few that come to mind – reckless driving124 and reckless 
 
 118. United States v. Baum, 555 F.3d 1129, 1133–36 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 119. United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 120. AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 98, at 27. 
 121. Guarnera, supra note 5, at 748–49. 
 122. See id. at 751–54. 
 123. Id. at 755–56. 
 124. See, e.g., the Florida reckless driving statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.192(1)(a) 
(West 2017) (“Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for 
the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.”). 
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endangerment125 – involve the conscious creation of risk of physical harm to 
persons or property.  There is no economic crime of which I am aware which 
criminalizes conscious disregard of the risk of a pecuniary harm that never 
comes to pass.126 
The final, and to me determinative, objection to Mr. Guarnera’s thesis is 
that the practical effect of adopting his intended loss definition would be to 
exacerbate what he himself identifies as a primary flaw in Section 2B1.1, that 
it “consistently generates [sentence] recommendations that are unacceptably 
high . . . because intended loss is an inherently flawed proxy for culpability.”127  
Changing the required mental state for “intended loss” from purposefulness to 
recklessness would increase the loss chargeable to many defendants, push them 
higher on the loss table, and thus increase their sentencing ranges. 
Mr. Guarnera’s discussion of United States v. Confredo128 illustrates this 
point perfectly.129  Confredo helped small businesses submit fraudulent loan 
applications to banks.130  The total amount requested in all these loan applica-
tions was $24 million.131  Some loan applications were denied and some were 
granted but were fully or partially repaid, so the banks’ total actual loss was $9 
million.132  The district court found that loss for Guidelines purposes should be 
intended loss in the amount of the full $24 million Confredo requested for his 
clients.133  Confredo argued that he did not expect all the loan applications to 
be granted, that he did expect that some of the loans approved would be repaid, 
and thus that he never expected or intended that the banks lose the full $24 
million.134  The Second Circuit held that Confredo should be allowed to prove 
what his subjective expectations were because intended loss requires “a sub-
jective intent to cause a loss.”135 
Mr. Guarnera believes the Second Circuit was wrong because, by request-
ing $24 million in dodgy loans, Confredo consciously created a risk, however 
 
 125. See, e.g., the Washington reckless endangerment statute, WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.36.050 (West 2017) (“A person is guilty of reckless endangerment when he 
or she recklessly engages in conduct not amounting to drive-by shooting but that creates 
a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.”). 
 126. A similar principle is at work in the nearly universal holding of Anglo-Amer-
ican law that one cannot attempt to commit a crime the mental state of which is reck-
lessness.  See generally State v. Smith, 534 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).  An 
attempt requires a purpose to accomplish a criminal end, but, by definition, a crime of 
recklessness involves heedlessness rather than purpose.  See id. at 1183. 
 127. Guarnera, supra note 5, at 719. 
 128. 528 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 129. Guarnera, supra note 5, at 754–56. 
 130. Id. at 752. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 752–53. 
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/5
2017] “LOSS” REVISITED  25 
small, that banks would suffer a loss of that entire amount.136  Adopting this 
approach would require Confredo to be sentenced based on a $24 million loss, 
whereas the Second Circuit’s opinion gave the defendant an opportunity to re-
duce the loss amount and thus his guideline sentencing range.  Few observers 
of the Guidelines are of the view that the existing definition of intended loss is 
too narrow and includes too few unrealized losses. 
Although I am unpersuaded by Mr. Guarnera’s proposal to make reck-
lessness the required mental state for counting unrealized economic losses in 
sentencing, the operation of intended loss in Section 2B1.1 is not without prob-
lems.  To these we now turn. 
E.  Further Thoughts on Risk and Intended Loss 
Mr. Guarnera is right that the role of risk of harm in the intended loss 
calculus deserves careful analysis.137  However, such analysis suggests that in 
some cases a fair assessment of the risk posed by the defendant’s conduct 
should limit, not expand, the universe of harms included in intended loss.  The 
Confredo case provides a good illustration of the basic issue. 
Mr. Guarnera would like defendant Confredo’s “intended loss” to be $24 
million, the sum of all the fraudulent loan applications he facilitated, on the 
theory that Confredo both sought loans in that amount and subjected the banks 
to a risk of losing that amount.138  The first half of that argument makes super-
ficial sense.  Confredo presumably submitted each of the fraudulent loan ap-
plications desiring that it result in a loan, and thus, if we consider his mental 
state only at the moments he submitted loan applications, then he can fairly be 
said to have intended to obtain all $24 million.  But the second part of the ar-
gument – that Confredo exposed the banks to a real risk of losing $24 million139 
– is strained.  Confredo’s explanation of the financial realities of the situation, 
self-serving though it may have been, was spot-on.  There was virtually no 
chance that all the banks would offer loans and a virtual certainty that some of 
those who did would be repaid wholly or in part.  Confredo’s scheme exposed 
the banks to a very high risk of losing some money but a tiny-to-nonexistent 
risk of losing $24 million. 
The problem this situation poses for a standard definition of intended loss 
is one of accounting for unrealized losses that a defendant subjectively desired 
to inflict, but that, given the facts of the case, had little or no chance of occur-
ring.  Punishing a defendant for unrealized harms of this type is a challenge to 
the basic rationale for “intended loss.”  Recall that use of intended loss as a 
sentencing factor is justified both because a proven desire to cause harm is a 
blameworthy mental state and because those who consciously seek to cause a 
particular harm can fairly be seen to present a heightened risk of causing that 
 
 136. Id. at 753. 
 137. Id. at 752–53. 
 138. Id. at 754. 
 139. Id. at 753–54. 
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harm and thus to represent a heightened social danger.  But suppose the evi-
dence proves that, whatever his intentions, the defendant’s conduct presented 
little or no real risk of causing any pecuniary harm, or at worst, a very small 
risk of causing the magnitude of pecuniary harm he sought to inflict.  In such 
a case, is use of intended loss justifiable? 
A fair argument can be made that in most cases the answer should be yes.  
Particularly in situations where the defendant’s plans were realistic and were 
thwarted only by bad luck, an alert victim, or the fact that the putative victim 
was actually a government operative conducting a “sting,” there seems little 
reason to ignore or discount intended loss.  In instances of this sort, the defend-
ant not only has the requisite evil mind, but his conduct suggests that, despite 
his miscalculation or bad fortune in the present case, he presents a continuing 
social risk fairly measured by the magnitude of the harm he sought to cause.  
Moreover, a rule dictating no loss enhancement where loss was effectively im-
possible because of government involvement would significantly undercut the 
effectiveness and deterrent value of undercover operations in fraud cases. 
That said, there remains a set of cases in which the defendant’s intentions 
are so far at variance with the genuine risk his scheme presented, either in the 
particular circumstances of the case at bar or otherwise, that it seems unfair to 
punish him for his wholly unrealistic expectations.  In 2001, the Commission 
rejected efforts to codify the so-called “economic reality” doctrine that some 
courts had previously applied to exclude from intended loss highly improbable 
economic harms.140  Intended loss now “includes intended pecuniary harm that 
would have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a government sting 
operation, or an insurance fraud in which the claim exceeded the insured 
amount).”141 
The Commission’s position is understandable.  It is theoretically defensi-
ble, protects law enforcement interests, and is relatively easy to apply.  Limit-
ing the inquiry to what the defendant subjectively intended eliminates the need 
to make an additional assessment of the relative improbability of events that 
never occurred.  Nonetheless, in my view, the intended loss rule would be im-
proved if it provided a limited mechanism for excluding highly improbable 
losses in cases other than government stings.  I long ago proposed that this be 
accomplished by writing into the intended loss rule a variant of the Model Pe-
nal Code approach to impossible attempts142 that would hold a defendant re-
sponsible for “all pecuniary harms he intended and which might reasonably 
have occurred if the facts were as he believed them to be.”143 
The phrase “if the facts were as he believed them to be” has the effect of 
holding a defendant responsible in most cases where the failure of his scheme 
 
 140. For a discussion of the economic reality doctrine, see Bowman, 2001 Federal 
Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms, supra note 2, at 80–81. 
 141. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii)(II) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 143. Bowman, Coping With “Loss,” supra note 2, at 567. 
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was due, not to any irresolution on the defendant’s part, but simply to a mistake 
of fact.  Hence, a defendant could claim no relief under this provision if the 
impossibility of his scheme as a whole, or the infliction of some particular 
quantum of loss, was due to the fact that he was dealing with undercover offic-
ers.  The phrase “which might reasonably have occurred” would give courts a 
means of excluding from intended loss those rare pecuniary harms that, despite 
being consciously sought by the defendant, could not realistically have oc-
curred, even if all the facts were as the defendant believed them to be.144 
F.  The Problematic Relation of “Actual Loss” to “Intended loss” in 
Section 2B1.1 
Even if one is convinced that the concept of “intended loss” has a role to 
play in economic crime sentencing, one might doubt that actual and intended 
loss should receive the same weight in Guidelines calculations.  Section 2B1.1 
instructs judges to use intended loss in cases where intended loss is greater than 
actual loss.145  To fully appreciate this instruction, one must consider four pos-
sible situations: (1) the actual loss equaled the intended loss; (2) the actual loss 
exceeded the intended loss; (3) there was an intended, but not an actual, loss; 
and (4) there was an actual loss, but the intended loss was greater. 
In the first situation, where the defendant stole exactly the amount he in-
tended to steal, intended loss has no Guidelines effect.  Indeed, a match be-
tween actual and intended loss has no practical significance at sentencing, ex-
cept, perhaps, insofar as a judge who finds a perfect convergence of the de-
fendant’s mental state with the quantum of actual harm caused by defendant’s 
conduct may be confirmed in the conclusion that the amount of loss is a good 
measurement of offense seriousness. 
In the second situation, where actual loss exceeds intended loss, once 
again intended loss has no Guidelines effect.  In such a case, the larger, unin-
tended-but-foreseeable actual harm trumps the smaller intended harm. 
The third situation, in which the defendant intended, but failed, to inflict 
any actual economic harm, is the case in which the practical need for intended 
loss as an offense seriousness metric is most obvious.  If the Guidelines are not 
to treat all defendants convicted of failed fraudulent schemes identically on the 
ground that the actual pecuniary harm in all such cases was nil, then the rules 
must identify factors that distinguish between more and less serious unsuccess-
ful schemes.  One relevant factor is the magnitude of the harm intended by the 
offender.  Throughout the Anglo-American law of inchoate crimes, the uni-
verse of unsuccessful convicted criminals is sorted largely by assessing the 
conjunction of mental state and desired harm, which is to say by focusing on 
 
 144. I would now modify my original phrasing to say that intended loss includes 
“all pecuniary harms the defendant intended and which might realistically have oc-
curred if the facts were as he believed them to be.” 
 145. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2004). 
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the seriousness of the wrong the defendant sought to commit.146  An attempt to 
commit murder is more serious than an attempt to commit assault.  A conspir-
acy to import a ton of heroin is a more serious crime than a conspiracy to sell 
an ounce of marijuana.  Accordingly, it hardly seems odd that an unsuccessful 
scheme to loot the treasury of a major corporation of millions should be a more 
serious crime than a failed attempt to embezzle a few thousand dollars from a 
federally insured bank. 
This is not to say that the amount a failed swindler intended to steal should 
be the only measure of the seriousness of his crime.  Other factors, such as the 
defendant’s role in the offense, the complexity and sophistication of the 
scheme, the proximity of the scheme to success, or the potential non-economic 
impacts of success had it occurred, might well be a part of the seriousness cal-
culus.  But some measure of the magnitude of the economic harm sought must 
surely be a factor in any rational schema for comparing inchoate economic 
crimes. 
The fourth and last situation, in which actual loss occurred but was ex-
ceeded by intended loss, raises the most troubling questions.  It is one thing to 
conclude that intended loss is a sound metric for comparing no-loss criminal 
schemes to one another.  However, in a case where an actual loss occurred but 
the intended loss was larger, a rule that an unrealized intended harm outweighs 
a harm that really happened requires some explaining.  Such a rule seems sen-
sible if one is trying to rank the relative offense seriousness of the crime of 
Defendant A, who intended to and did cause a loss of exactly $100,000, and 
the crime of Defendant B, who obtained $100,000 as part of a scheme that was 
intended to secure $1 million, and might have done so if not interrupted by the 
police.  These defendants caused the same actual economic harm.  But the ad-
ditional criminal aspirations of Defendant B would seem to render him the 
more blameworthy (and socially dangerous) offender, and a higher sentence 
for him seems entirely justifiable.  But suppose the comparison is between De-
fendant A, who set out to and did steal exactly $100,000, and Defendant C, who 
set out to steal $1 million but secured only $10,000.  Or suppose Defendant C 
sought $1 million but obtained nothing at all.  How do we rank a completely 
successful, if only modestly ambitious, crook in comparison to an ambitious 
criminal who achieves only modest success or none at all? 
There are three possible answers: (1) maintain the approach of Section 
2B1.1 and treat actual loss and intended loss as equivalent measures of offense 
seriousness; (2) assign actual loss and intended loss different weights in the 
sentencing calculus, which would require establishing some kind of conversion 
ratio between them; or (3) abandon intended, but unrealized, loss as a measure 
of offense seriousness.  Consider these possibilities in reverse order. 
Abandon intended loss: I am aware of only one serious proposal that in-
tended loss be excised altogether from Guidelines calculations.  The ABA’s 
Economic Crime Sentencing Task Force issued a report in 2014 recommending 
 
 146. Guarnera, supra note 5, at 736–37. 
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that “loss” for Guidelines purposes be limited to actual loss.147  Remarkably, 
this dramatic alteration to current practice received no discussion in the report. 
Without presuming to read the minds of the ABA Task Force members, 
their proposal seems to embrace a sort of “no harm, no foul” principle for swin-
dlers and thieves.  Under their proposal, unless a criminal actually succeeded 
in causing a large pecuniary loss, meaningful punishment would almost never 
be recommended by the Guidelines, regardless of the malignance of the de-
fendant’s intentions, the complexity of his scheme, the extent of his prepara-
tions, the proximity to success, or the reason for failure.148  Even schemes de-
feated only because of discovery by the intended victim or the timely interven-
tion of law enforcement would be treated for sentencing purposes as the next 
thing to a non-event.149  And of course, the absence of some accounting for 
intended loss would eliminate any metric for distinguishing between a wholly 
successful minor crook and an only partially successful major swindler whose 
crime inflicted a small loss but was designed to cause a far larger one. 
The law treats no other class of crime this way.  If your enemy shoots at 
you intending to kill you, but misses, the law does not say, “No harm, no foul,” 
and charge the shooter only with the unlawful discharge of a firearm.150  To the 
contrary, it charges him with attempted murder, and upon conviction, punishes 
him severely for his unconsummated homicidal intentions.  If a defendant grabs 
a woman and pulls her into a bush intending to rape her, but she escapes, the 
law does not say that the only actual harm to the victim was a transitory fright, 
and therefore that the only charge will be for a minor assault.151  To the con-
trary, the charge and punishment will be for the appropriately grave offense of 
attempted rape.  As noted above, without some measure of intended economic 
harm, there is no obvious way to rank the relative seriousness of unsuccessful 
schemes, either in comparison with each other or in comparison with wholly 
or partially successful ones.  Candidly, I think it unlikely that the ABA Task 
Force’s suggestion of abandoning intended loss altogether will gain much trac-
tion. 
Weight actual and intended loss differently: Even if intended loss is not 
to be entirely abandoned, a system that weights intended but unrealized harm 
 
 147. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 39 (proposing a model Section 2B1.1 in 
which the definition of “loss” in its Application Note 1 would be “incorporated from 
current 2B1.1 with the modification that loss means actual loss”). 
 148. See id.  The ABA Task Force model guideline contains four basic components: 
a base offense, a loss table, a set of “culpability” adjustments, and a set of “victim 
impact” adjustments.  Id.  The model is structured in such a way that, without a loss 
enhancement, it would be very difficult for a defendant to achieve an offense level that 
would call for incarceration, and nearly impossible to generate an offense calling for 
more than minimal incarceration.  If intended loss could never be counted on the loss 
table, the result would effectively be a free sentencing pass for unsuccessful economic 
criminals. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012). 
 151. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030(2) (West 2017). 
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as exactly equivalent to actual harm actually caused by a defendant’s crime is 
disquieting.  At the root of the difficulty is the fact that there are really at least 
three kinds of loss: (1) actual loss the defendant subjectively intended to cause 
(or at least expected he would cause); (2) actual loss the defendant did not sub-
jectively intend to cause, but which was the foreseeable consequence of his 
criminal conduct; and (3) intended loss that never occurred. 
One can fairly argue that intended, but unrealized, loss is, on some rough 
scale, morally equivalent to and therefore ought to count roughly the same as 
actual loss that was unintended, but foreseeably caused by, fraudulent conduct.  
In the case of intended, but unrealized, loss, the defendant’s mental state is 
arguably more blameworthy than in the case of merely foreseeable loss.  In 
both cases, there was an intent to steal something, because without such an 
intent, no conviction could have occurred.  However, in the first case the harm 
intended was larger than in the second case, while in the second case, the de-
fendant inflicted more actual harm than in the first case, even though he lacked 
a specific purpose to inflict it. 
The tougher comparison is between, on the one hand, loss that was both 
intended by the defendant and actually occurred, and on the other hand, loss 
that was intended by the defendant but never happened.  The mental state in 
both these cases is the same, but the first involves an actual harm and the sec-
ond involves none at all.  At least in the abstract, it would seem that intended 
actual harm should count more than intended harm that never happened. 
The substantive law on this point in other crime types varies.  For some 
crime types in some jurisdictions, an unsuccessful conspiracy or attempt to 
commit a crime is a less serious offense than the object crime.  For example, 
in Colorado, an attempt to commit a felony is generally graded as one classifi-
cation less serious than the object felony.152  But the reverse is true for other 
crime types and other jurisdictions.  Federal law, in particular, tends to grade 
conspiracies and attempts as equivalent in seriousness to completed crimes.153  
And as noted, most federal fraud crimes are inchoate offenses themselves.  The 
crime is the making of the scheme or the attempt to carry it out, not the suc-
cessful achievement of the criminal objective. 
How to address the apparent incongruity arising from the existence of 
different categories of loss is far from obvious.  The most ambitious approach 
would be to weight each of the three categories differently.  Intended actual 
loss might count the most.  Actual, unintended, but foreseeable, loss might 
count a bit less.  Intended, but unrealized, loss might count the least.  However, 
even if one concurred in this theoretical ordering of loss types, devising guide-
lines rules to implement it would be very difficult.  Even more problematic in 
 
 152. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-2-101(4) (West 2017). 
 153. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012) (“Any person who attempts or conspires to 
commit any offense under this chapter [which covers mail fraud and other fraud of-
fenses] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the 
commission of which was the object of the . . . conspiracy.”). 
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practice would be the fact-finding burden placed on judges to make the fine 
distinctions between the categories. 
A somewhat simpler approach would be to recognize only two categories 
of loss – intended and actual – as having different sentencing consequences.  
In such a regime, one might treat intended, but unrealized, loss as being inher-
ently less weighty than actual loss, whether intended or merely foreseeable, 
and assign some discount to intended loss.  Such a discount might take one of 
several forms. 
One could calculate intended loss and then literally discount that number 
by some percentage before plugging the result into the loss table.  However, 
this would present numerous problems.  The primary theoretical question 
would be the size of the discount – on what rational basis could one assign a 
constant discount ratio?  Should intended loss count one-half as much as actual 
loss?  Two-thirds as much?  How would one decide?  Additionally, cases in 
which there were both actual and intended loss would present a Guidelines de-
sign problem.  If intended loss without the discount exceeded actual loss but 
was less than actual loss once discounted, should the loss table figure be actual 
loss alone?  That would seem a peculiar result inasmuch as such a rule would 
treat as equivalent Defendant A, who caused actual loss of $X and intended no 
additional loss, and Defendant B, who caused actual loss of $X, but also in-
tended to cause a large loss in excess of $X.154 
Alternatively, one could treat intended loss as equivalent to actual loss for 
purposes of the loss table, but then employ a blanket offense level discount, 
providing that, in any case in which the loss amount was determined by appli-
cation of the greater intended loss rule, the offense level produced by applica-
tion of Section 2B1.1 should be reduced by some number of levels.155  How-
ever, the design and application issues inherent in this approach are similar to 
those presented by a percentage discount of the intended loss figure itself.  How 
many levels should be subtracted?  Should the number be the same for small 
intended loss figures as for large ones?  In a case with both intended and actual 
loss, if intended loss is larger, does the defendant get the entire offense-level 
discount, even if that would reduce his offense level to below that which would 
apply if the actual loss figure were used? 
I am intrigued by the possibility of discounting intended loss.  However, 
I am leery of the practical difficulties in designing such a discount to make it 
both defensible in principle and workable in practice.  Perhaps the most work-
able approach would be non-computational.  That is, the intended loss rules 
should: (1) continue to require that sentencing courts calculate intended loss as 
 
 154. James Gibson long ago proposed a neat solution to this design problem – av-
erage actual and intended loss.  James Gibson, How Much Should Mind Matter? Mens 
Rea in Theft and Fraud Sentencing, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 136, 138 (1997).  I think this 
solution a bit mechanistic, but it has attractions. 
 155. Something like this existed in the pre-2001 regime via a cross-reference in the 
fraud guideline, §2F1.1, to the attempt guideline, §2X1.1.  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL §2F1.1 cmt. n.10 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2000). 
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they now do but (2) recommend that judges imposing sentences should con-
sider that intended, but unrealized, loss may overstate the seriousness of the 
offense. 
Maintain the status quo: In truth, until the Commission decides that it 
wants to materially alter the Guidelines’ structure, either for all offenses or just 
for economic crimes, the basic definition of loss, and the relation between ac-
tual and intended loss, is likely to remain essentially the same.  For now, advo-
cates who are not happy with the balance struck by the current rules will have 
to convince judges to employ their Booker-enabled discretion to make adjust-
ments. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I close by reiterating that I am far from satisfied with the current state of 
Section 2B1.1, the economic crime guideline.  I agree with Mr. Guarnera and 
many others that it can, in too many cases, suggest unreasonable sentences, and 
I have in other settings proposed amendments to address this difficulty.  I also 
agree that in the wake of Booker’s transformation of the Guidelines from 
strongly presumptive to purely advisory, the Sentencing Commission ought to 
reconfigure, not just Section 2B1.1, but the entire guideline structure to take 
conscious account of the reality of current federal sentencing practice.  If and 
when that reconstruction project commences in earnest, the result will surely 
be less rule-bound and more standard-like, as Mr. Guarnera would prefer.156  
However, for the immediate future, we have the guideline we have, with the 
“loss” concept at its core.  What I hope to have demonstrated here is that “loss” 
is properly central to economic crime sentencing (even though the degree of its 
influence on sentences should be reduced), and that the Section 2B1.1 defini-
tion of “loss” and its components – actual loss and intended loss – are funda-
mentally sound (even if some tweaks might be beneficial). 
 
 
 156. Guarnera, supra note 5, at 762–67. 
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